Everything your executor will need, in one encrypted file.

Executor File is a free, open-source register of every account, asset and liability you own, and one printed page that tells your executor how to open it. A file your family keeps. Not a service that can die.

Someone has died and you have the printed page? Open the Executor File

Two artefacts carry everything

estate.yaml.age

Your Executor File

An encrypted register of every account, asset and liability, with what you want done about each one. It stores pointers, never passwords. It can be backed up anywhere, because on its own it opens nothing.

One printed page

The Executor Instructions

Stored with the will. It tells your executor where the file is, who holds the three key shares, and the three commands that open it. Written for a non-technical person under stress.

What is not here is the point

  • No account.
  • No server.
  • No subscription.
  • No credentials stored.
  • No company that can shut down.

Your family keeps a file and one printed page. That is the whole product. Every hosted service in this category is a bet that a company outlives you. A file makes no such bet.

How it works, in three steps

  1. Write it

    Fill in a plain text register: every account, what it is, where the login lives, and what you want done. About an hour, one entry at a time.

  2. Seal it

    One command encrypts it and splits the key into three printed shares. Any two open the file; one alone opens nothing. It proves the chain works before it reports success.

  3. Print it

    Print the one-page instructions and store them with the will. Give one share each to three people you trust. Done.

The full picture, including the threat model

Reasons to believe

  • Open source, MIT. Read every line before trusting it.
  • Recovery uses two standard tools. Stock age and ssss. If the project vanished tomorrow, the file still opens.
  • No credentials, enforced. The validators actively reject credential-shaped data.
  • Honest limits, published. What it does not defend is stated as plainly as what it does.

Why trust this

Built by someone who has been the executor with nothing to go on. Read the story.

What it refuses to do

Deliberately out of scope

No credential storage (that’s your password manager’s job). No provider APIs, generated emails, or liquidation automation (that’s where legal liability and per-jurisdiction rules live). No hosted anything — public hosting of an encrypted register hands attackers an indefinite offline brute-force target. The value of this tool is discovery plus disposition; everything else is somebody’s bereavement process.

Pulled from the project README at build time, commit 8b1a19a.